1	SEYFARTH SHAW LLP		
2	Timothy M. Rusche (SBN 230036) trusche@seyfarth.com		
3	601 South Figueroa Street, Suite 3300 Los Angeles, California 90017-5793		
4	Telephone: (213) 270-9600 Facsimile: (213) 270-9601		
5	SEYFARTH SHAW LLP Mike W. Kopp (SBN 206385)		
6	mkopp@seyfarth.com 400 Capitol Mall, Suite 2350		
7	Sacramento, California 95814-4428 Telephone: (916) 448-0159		
8	Facsimile: (916) 558-4839		
9	Attorneys for Defendant MARATHON REFINING LOGISTICS SERVICES	, LLC	
10		,	
11	UNITED STATES	DISTRICT COURT	
12	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
13		01 01 0111111	
14	JANICE WOOD, ANTHONY ALFARO and AARON DIETRICH on behalf of themselves and	Case No. 4:19-cv-04287-YGR	
15	others similarly situated,	Hon. Yvonne Gonzales Rogers	
16	Plaintiffs,	DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO	
17	v.	PLAINTIFFS' FIFTH AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT	
18 19	MARATHON REFINING LOGISTICS SERVICES LLC and DOES 1 THROUGH AND		
	INCLUDING 25,	G 1 1 1 1 1 24 2010	
20 21	Defendants.	Complaint Filed: June 24, 2019 Fifth Amended Complaint Filed: June 17, 2022	
22			
23			
24			
25			
26			
27			
28			

Defendant Marathon Refining Logistics Services LLC ("Defendant" or "Marathon") hereby answers the Fifth Amended Complaint ("Complaint") filed by Plaintiffs Janice Wood, Anthony Alfaro, and Aaron Dietrich ("Plaintiffs") in the above-captioned action.

- 1. Answering paragraph 1, Defendant admits that Plaintiffs purport to bring a class action on behalf of themselves and others against Defendant but denies that a class action is appropriate.

 Defendant denies the remaining allegations.
- 2. Answering paragraph 2, Defendant admits the parties have entered a stipulation, the specific terms of which are set out at Dkt. 53. Defendant admits that Plaintiffs have quoted portions of the stipulation, but denies that Plaintiffs have accurately or fully set out the complete terms and conditions of the stipulation, the terms of which speak for themselves as reflected in the stipulation itself. Defendant denies all remaining allegations in paragraph 2.
- 3. Answering paragraph 3, Defendant admits the parties have entered a stipulation, the specific terms of which are set out at Dkt. 53. Defendant denies that Plaintiffs have accurately or fully set out the complete terms and conditions of the stipulation, the terms of which speak for themselves as reflected in the stipulation itself. Defendant denies all remaining allegations in paragraph 3.
- 4. Answering paragraph 4, Defendant admits that certain, but not all, Operators at its refinery in Martinez, California have been scheduled to work 12 hour shifts. Defendant denies that operators at Marathon's Martinez refinery must regularly be available for designated 12 hour standby "shifts" twice a day. Defendant asserts that the various collectively-bargained standby procedures, practices and exceptions to which Plaintiffs and other Operators at the Martinez refinery consented provide that the Union and employees determine participation and designation of standby, and that this Union and employee-determined process varies by unit. Defendant denies the remaining allegations.
- 5. Answering paragraph 5, Defendant admits that certain, but not all, Operators at its refinery in Martinez, California have negotiated and consented via their Union representatives to a standby process that includes the referenced time periods, but that the practices vary by unit. Defendant avers that the governing collective bargaining agreements, side letters, and shop practice provide for exceptions not identified in Plaintiffs' allegations. Defendant denies that the collectively-bargained standby procedures "significantly constrain" Operators' activities. Defendant admits that Operators,

when they are not contacted on standby, generally are not paid for standby when they have not reported for work, have not been directed to work, nor been suffered or permitted to work, and were not under Defendant's control. Defendant denies the remaining allegations.

- 6. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 6.
- 7. Answering paragraph 7, Defendant admits that certain, but not all, maintenance workers at its refinery in Martinez, California have negotiated and consented via their Union representatives to a standby process, but that the practice varies, and that the governing collective bargaining agreements, side letters, and shop practice provide for exceptions not identified in Plaintiffs' allegations. Defendant denies that the collectively-bargained standby procedures "significantly constrain" maintenance workers' activities. Defendant admits that maintenance workers, when they are not contacted on standby, generally are not paid for standby when they have not reported for work, have not been directed to work, nor been suffered or permitted to work, and were not under Defendant's control. Defendant denies the remaining allegations.
 - 8. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 8.
- 9. Answering paragraph 9, Defendant admits that certain, but not all, Operators at its refinery in Martinez, California have negotiated and consented via their Union representatives to a standby process that includes the referenced time periods, but that the practices vary by unit. Defendant denies that the collectively-bargained standby procedures prohibit the identified activities. Defendant avers that the collective bargaining agreements, side letter agreements and shop practice provide for Union and employee (rather than employer) designations as to who participates in standby, provide exceptions not identified in Plaintiffs' allegations, and vary by unit. Defendant denies the remaining allegations.
 - 10. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 10.
 - 11. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 11.
 - 12. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 12.
- 13. Answering paragraph 13, the allegations are conclusions of law as opposed to allegations of fact and, as such, no answer is required. To the extent this paragraph purports to contain any allegations of fact or an answer is otherwise required, Defendant admits plaintiffs' allegations partially

quote Wage Order 1-2001, but denies the remaining allegations, including any allegation or inference that reporting time pay is due or even applicable.

- 14. Answering paragraph 14, Defendant admits that maintenance workers and operators, when they are not contacted on standby, generally are not paid for standby when they have not reported for work, have not been directed to work, nor been suffered or permitted to work, and were not under Defendant's control The remaining allegations contain conclusions of law as opposed to allegations of fact and, as such, no answer is required. To the extent these remaining allegations purport to contain any allegations of fact or an answer is otherwise required, Defendant denies the remaining allegations.
- 15. Defendant lacks sufficient knowledge and information about Plaintiff's current county of residence to respond to the allegation and denies it on that basis. Defendant denies the remaining allegations in paragraph 15.
- 16. Defendant lacks sufficient knowledge and information about Plaintiff's current county of residence to respond to the allegation and denies it on that basis. Defendant admits the remaining allegations in paragraph 16.
- 17. Defendant lacks sufficient knowledge and information about Plaintiff's current county of residence to respond to the allegation and denies it on that basis. Defendant denies the remaining allegations in paragraph 17.
- 18. Answering paragraph 18, Defendant admits it is a Limited Liability Company organized under Delaware law, and operates refineries in California, with its headquarters located in Findlay, Ohio. The remaining allegations contain conclusions of law as opposed to allegations of fact and, as such, no answer is required.
- 19. Answering paragraph 19, Plaintiffs' allegations regarding DOE defendants are legal conclusions and argument to which no answer is required. To the extent the allegations in this paragraph contain any factual allegations, Defendant denies the allegations.
- 20. Answering paragraph 20, Plaintiffs' allegations regarding DOE defendants are legal conclusions and argument to which no answer is required. To the extent the allegations in this paragraph contain any factual allegations, Defendant denies the allegations.

- 21. Answering paragraph 21, Plaintiffs' allegations regarding DOE defendants are legal conclusions and argument to which no answer is required. To the extent the allegations in this paragraph contain any factual allegations, Defendant denies the allegations.
- 22. Answering paragraph 22, the allegations are conclusions of law as opposed to allegations of fact and, as such, no answer is required.
- 23. Answering paragraph 23, the allegations are conclusions of law as opposed to allegations of fact and, as such, no answer is required. Defendant admits that the Martinez refinery conducts business within the Northern District, and admits that the state court from which the action was removed is within the territory of the Northern District.
- 24. Answering paragraph 24, the allegations are conclusions of law as opposed to allegations of fact and, as such, no answer is required.
- 25. Answering paragraph 25, the allegations contain conclusions of law as opposed to allegations of fact and, as such, no answer is required. To the extent this paragraph purports to contain any allegations of fact or an answer is otherwise required, Defendant admits plaintiffs' allegations partially quote Wage Order 1-2001, but denies the remaining allegations, including any allegation or inference that reporting time pay is due or even applicable.
- 26. Answering paragraph 26, the allegations are conclusions of law as opposed to allegations of fact and, as such, no answer is required. To the extent this paragraph purports to contain any allegations of fact or an answer is otherwise required, Defendant denies the allegations.
- 27. The Court struck references to Labor Code section 1198 from paragraph 27 in its Order granting in part and denying in part Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Fifth Amended Complaint. *See* Dkt. 120. Accordingly, no allegations remain and no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendant denies the allegations.
- 28. Answering paragraph 28, the allegations are conclusions of law as opposed to allegations of fact and, as such, no answer is required. To the extent this paragraph purports to contain any allegations of fact or an answer is otherwise required, Defendant denies the allegations.
 - 29. Answering paragraph 29, Defendant denies the allegations.
 - 30. Answering paragraph 30, Defendant denies the allegations.

- 31. Answering paragraph 31, Defendant admits that certain, but not all, operators at its refinery in Martinez, California have negotiated and consented via their Union representatives to a standby process, but that the practice varies, and that the governing collective bargaining agreements, side letters, and shop practice provide for exceptions not identified in Plaintiffs' allegations. Defendant denies the remaining allegations.
- 32. Answering paragraph 32, Defendant admits that certain, but not all, maintenance workers at its refinery in Martinez, California have negotiated and consented via their Union representatives to a standby process, but that the practice varies, and that the governing collective bargaining agreements, side letters, and shop practice provide for exceptions not identified in Plaintiffs' allegations. Defendant denies the remaining allegations.
- 33. Answering paragraph 33, Defendant avers that Plaintiffs negotiated and consented via their Union representatives to standby procedures, but denies that Plaintiffs have accurately and completely described those agreements in their allegations, including their allegations regarding discipline. Defendant further avers that the procedures varied, and that the governing collective bargaining agreements, side letters, and shop practice provide for exceptions not identified in Plaintiffs' allegations. Defendant denies the remaining allegations.
- 34. Answering paragraph 34, Defendant admits that operators and maintenance workers, when they are not contacted on standby, generally are not paid for standby when they have not reported for work, have not been directed to work, nor been suffered or permitted to work, and were not under Defendant's control. Defendant denies the remaining allegations.
- 35. Answering paragraph 35, Defendant admits that Plaintiffs purport to bring a class action against Defendant but denies that a class action is appropriate. Defendants further respond that the remaining allegations are conclusions of law as opposed to allegations of fact and, as such, no answer is required. To the extent the remaining allegations purport to contain allegations of fact or an answer is otherwise required, Defendant denies those allegations.
- 36. Answering paragraph 36, Defendant admits that Plaintiffs purport to bring a class action against Defendant but denies that a class action is appropriate. Defendants further respond that the remaining allegations are conclusions of law as opposed to allegations of fact and, as such, no answer is

required. To the extent the remaining allegations purport to contain allegations of fact or an answer is otherwise required, Defendant denies those allegations.

- 37. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 37...
- 38. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 38.
- 39. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 39.
- 40. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 40.
- 41. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 41.
- 42. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 42.
- 43. Answering paragraph 43, Defendant lacks sufficient knowledge and information about Plaintiffs' beliefs and knowledge (such as what they are or are not aware of) to respond to the allegations and denies them on that basis. Defendant denies the remaining allegations.
- 44. Answering paragraph 44, Defendant admits that at all times Plaintiffs' employment was covered by the governing collective bargaining agreements, side letters, and Union and employer shop practice, but denies that Plaintiffs have attached the complete set of such agreements. The remaining allegations are conclusions of law as opposed to allegations of fact and, as such, no answer is required. To the extent this paragraph purports to contain any allegations of fact or an answer is otherwise required, Defendant denies those allegations.
 - 45. Defendant denies the allegations in Paragraph 45.
- 46. Answering paragraph 46, Defendant admits that at all times Plaintiffs' employment was covered by the governing collective bargaining agreements, side letters, and Union and employer shop practice, but denies that Plaintiffs has attached the complete set of such agreements. Defendant admits Plaintiffs have partially quoted the CBA attached at Exhibit B. Defendant denies the allegation that no separate agreement was entered. Defendant lacks sufficient knowledge and information about Plaintiffs' beliefs and knowledge to respond to the allegations and denies them on that basis. The remaining allegations are conclusions of law as opposed to allegations of fact and, as such, no answer is required. To the extent these remaining allegations purport to contain any allegations of fact or an answer is otherwise required, Defendant denies those allegations.

- 47. Answering paragraph 47, Defendant admits that at all times Plaintiffs' employment was covered by the governing collective bargaining agreements, side letters, and Union and employer shop practice, but denies that Plaintiffs have attached the complete set of such agreements. Defendant admits that the first sentence of paragraph 47 partially quotes the referenced CBA attached as Exhibit B. The remaining allegations are conclusions of law as opposed to allegations of fact and, as such, no answer is required. To the extent these remaining allegations purport to contain any allegations of fact or an answer is otherwise required, Defendant denies those allegations.
- 48. Answering paragraph 48, the allegations are conclusions of law as opposed to allegations of fact and, as such, no answer is required. Defendant admits Plaintiffs have partially quoted the Court's order at Dkt. 24. To the extent this paragraph purports to contain any allegations of fact or an answer is otherwise required, Defendant denies those allegations.
- 49. Answering paragraph 49 the allegations are legal argument and conclusions of law as opposed to allegations of fact and, as such, no answer is required. To the extent this paragraph purports to contain any allegations of fact or an answer is otherwise required, Defendant denies those allegations.
- 50. Answering paragraph 50, the allegations are legal argument and conclusions of law as opposed to allegations of fact and, as such, no answer is required. To the extent this paragraph purports to contain any allegations of fact or an answer is otherwise required, Defendant denies those allegations.
- 51. Answering paragraph 51, the allegations are legal argument and conclusions of law as opposed to allegations of fact and, as such, no answer is required. To the extent this paragraph purports to contain any allegations of fact or an answer is otherwise required, Defendant denies those allegations.
- 52. Answering paragraph 52, the allegations are legal argument and conclusions of law as opposed to allegations of fact and, as such, no answer is required. To the extent this paragraph purports to contain any allegations of fact or an answer is otherwise required, Defendant denies those allegations.
- 53. Answering paragraph 53, the allegations are legal argument and conclusions of law as opposed to allegations of fact and, as such, no answer is required. Defendant admits Plaintiffs have partially quoted the Court's order at Dkt. 24. To the extent this paragraph purports to contain any allegations of fact or an answer is otherwise required, Defendant denies those allegations.

2

3

45

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

1718

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

2627

28

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

- 54. Answering this paragraph 54, Defendant incorporates the responses contained in the previous paragraphs of this Answer as if fully set forth herein.
- 55. Answering paragraph 55, the allegations are conclusions of law as opposed to allegations of fact and, as such, no answer is required. To the extent this paragraph purports to contain any allegations of fact or an answer is otherwise required, Defendant admits plaintiffs' allegations partially quote Wage Order 1-2001, but denies the remaining allegations, including any allegation or inference that reporting time pay is due.
 - 56. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 56.
- 57. The Court struck the references in paragraph 57 pertaining to Lab. Code section 1198 in its Order granting in part and denying in part Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Fifth Amended Complaint. *See* Dkt. 120. Defendant denies the remaining allegations.
 - 58. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 58.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

- 59. Answering this paragraph 59, Defendant incorporates the responses contained in the previous paragraphs of this Answer as if fully set forth herein.
- 60. Answering paragraph 60, the allegations are conclusions of law as opposed to allegations of fact and, as such, no answer is required. To the extent this paragraph purports to contain any allegations of fact or an answer is otherwise required, Defendant admits that Labor Code Sections 201 and 202 set forth provisions regarding the timing of wage payments and section 203 provides for certain penalties, but denies the remaining allegations.
 - 61. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 61.
 - 62. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 62.
 - 63. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 63.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

64. Answering this paragraph 64, Defendant incorporates the responses contained in the previous paragraphs of this Answer as if fully set forth herein.

- 65. Answering paragraph 65, the allegations are conclusions of law as opposed to allegations of fact and, as such, no answer is required. To the extent this paragraph purports to contain any allegations of fact or an answer is otherwise required, Defendant admits that the applicable Wage Order and Labor Code 226 contain certain requirements regarding itemized information on wage statements, but denies the remaining allegations.
 - 66. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 66.
 - 67. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 67.
 - 68. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 68.
 - 69. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 69.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

- 70. Answering this paragraph 70, Defendant incorporates the responses contained in the previous paragraphs of this Answer as if fully set forth herein.
- 71. Answering paragraph 71, the allegations are conclusions of law as opposed to allegations of fact and, as such, no answer is required. To the extent this paragraph purports to contain any allegations of fact or an answer is otherwise required, Defendant admits that Section 17200 prohibits unlawful business acts, but denies the remaining allegations.
 - 72. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 72.
 - 73. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 73.
 - 74. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 74.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

- 75. Answering paragraph 75 (mislabeled as duplicative paragraph 72 at 19:13-145), Defendant incorporates the responses contained in the previous paragraphs of this Answer as if fully set forth herein.
- 76. Answering paragraph 76 (mislabeled as duplicative paragraph 73 at 19:15-17), the allegations are conclusions of law as opposed to allegations of fact and, as such, no answer is required. To the extent this paragraph purports to contain any allegations of fact or an answer is otherwise required, Defendant denies the allegations.

- 77. Answering paragraph 77 (mislabeled as duplicative paragraph 74 at 19:18-19), the allegations are conclusions of law as opposed to allegations of fact and, as such, no answer is required. To the extent this paragraph purports to contain any allegations of fact or an answer is otherwise required, Defendant denies the allegations.
- 78. Answering paragraph 78 (misidentified as duplicative paragraph 75 at 19:20-23), the Court struck references the paragraph to Lab. Code sections 98.3, 226.7, and 1198 in its Order granting in part and denying in part Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Fifth Amended Complaint. *See* Dkt. 120. Defendant denies the remaining allegations.
- 79. Answering paragraph 79 (misidentified as a duplicative paragraph 76 at 19:24-20:1), Defendant admits Plaintiffs served Marathon notice of its intent to seek PAGA penalties, but Defendant lacks sufficient knowledge and information about when Plaintiffs served the LWDA to respond to the allegations and denies them on that basis. Defendant denies the remaining allegations.
- 80. Answering paragraph 80 (misidentified as a duplicative paragraph 77 at 20:2-5), Defendant lacks sufficient knowledge and information about when Plaintiffs served the LWDA to respond to the allegations and denies them on that basis. Defendant denies all remaining allegations.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Defendant expressly denies that Plaintiffs are entitled to any relief.

AFFIRMATIVE OR OTHER DEFENSES

In further answer to the Complaint, Defendants allege the following additional defenses. In asserting these defenses, Defendants do not assume the burden of proof as to the matters that, pursuant to law, are Plaintiffs' burden to prove.

FIRST DEFENSE

(No Knowing or Intentional Violation)

Plaintiffs and the current or former employees on whose behalf they brought the action are not entitled to any penalty award, including, but not limited to, under section 226 of the California Labor Code and the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, Labor Code § 2698 et seq., since, at all relevant times, Defendant acted in good faith and did not willfully, knowingly or intentionally fail to comply with the California Labor Code but rather acted in good faith and had reasonable grounds for believing

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

that it did not violate the California Labor Code because, among other things, it complied with the Labor Code, had lawful policies and procedures regarding standby consented to by Plaintiffs' via their Union, and paid employees all wages owed.

SECOND DEFENSE

(Good Faith)

Plaintiffs, and the individuals they seek to represent, are not entitled to Labor Code section 203 penalties because a good faith dispute exists as to whether reporting time was owed at termination for Union-negotiated standby processes, including for the alleged instances at issue, where the employees were never contacted and never reported to work, such that Defendants cannot be held to have willfully failed to comply with the requirements of the applicable Labor Code sections.

THIRD DEFENSE

(Due Process/Excessive Fines Unconstitutional)

Although Defendant denies that it committed or had responsibility for any act that could support the recovery of penalties in this lawsuit, if and to the extent any such act or responsibility is found, recovery of penalties against Defendant is confiscatory and unconstitutional under numerous provisions of the United States Constitution and the California Constitution, including the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment, the due process clauses of the Fifth Amendment and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and other provisions of the United States Constitution, and the excessive fines clause of Section 17 of Article I, the due process clause of Section 7 of Article I, and other provisions of the California Constitution.

FOURTH DEFENSE

(Failure to Mitigate Damages or Avoid Consequences)

Plaintiffs and the current or former employees on whose behalf they brought the action have failed to mitigate or avoid their damages or other alleged harm because they failed to take any steps to report or avoid the Labor Code violations alleged in the Complaint.

1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	

FIFTH DEFENSE

(LMRA Preemption)

Plaintiffs and the current or former employees on whose behalf he brought the action were and are at all times represented by a Union and subject to governing collectively-bargained agreements, side letter agreements, and governing Union and employer shop practice. Plaintiffs' claims require interpretation of those governing agreements, side letters and shop practice, and are therefore completely preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act. Due to Plaintiffs' admitted failure to exhaust the grievance and arbitration process provided in the governing agreements, Plaintiffs' claims are completely preempted.

SIXTH DEFENSE

(Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies)

Plaintiffs' claim for civil penalties pursuant to the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, Labor Code § 2698 et seq., is barred to the extent Plaintiffs failed to timely and fully exhaust her administrative remedies before the Labor and Workforce Development Agency of the State of California and/or the Department of Industrial Relations.

SEVENTH DEFENSE

(Manageability)

Plaintiffs' claim for civil penalties pursuant to the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, Labor Code § 2698 et seq., is not proper for treatment as a representative action under PAGA because, among other reasons, the representative action is not manageable.

EIGHTH DEFENSE

(Inability To Pursue Penalties Under California Labor Code § 2698 et seq.)

Plaintiffs' PAGA claim is barred because Plaintiffs seek PAGA penalties for alleged violations of the Labor Code that already contain a statutory or other civil penalty.

NINTH DEFENSE

(Waiver)

Because of Plaintiffs' own acts and/or omissions, in consenting via their collective bargaining representatives to Union-negotiated standby processes, in which Plaintiffs and other employees

determined and elected their participation in standby, Plaintiffs are barred by the equitable doctrine of waiver from maintaining this action or pursuing any cause of action alleged in the Complaint against Defendant.

TENTH DEFENSE

(Estoppel/Consent)

Plaintiffs and the employees they seek to represent, having negotiated for and having consented to a collectively-bargained standby processes, in which Plaintiffs and other employees determined and elected their participation in standby, and having never grieved, challenged, or sought modification of that process, are barred by the equitable doctrine of estoppel from maintaining this action or pursuing any cause of action alleged in the Complaint against Defendant.

ELEVENTH DEFENSE

(Offset)

To the extent that Plaintiffs and the employees they seek to represent are entitled to reporting time pay and any derivative penalties or payments (which Defendant denies), Defendant is entitled to an offset for any payments of wages or other penalties or remuneration provided to those parties, including in overlapping putative class and representative actions.

TWELFTH DEFENSE

(Unclean Hands)

Plaintiffs and the employees they seek to represent, having negotiated for and having consented to an allegedly oppressive collectively-bargained standby processes, in which Plaintiffs and other employees determined and elected their participation in standby, and having never grieved, challenged, or sought modification of that allegedly oppressive process are barred by the doctrine of unclean hands.

THIRTEENTH DEFENSE

(Inability To Establish Liability)

Plaintiffs and the employees they seek to represent, having negotiated for and having consented to a collectively-bargained standby processes, in which individual units could and did determine their own unique standby process and agree to informal, undocumented trading of standby cannot establish if,

1 when, or how often any of them were on mandatory standby subject to the alleged obligation to remain 2 at the ready to receive calls requesting that they cover a work shift. 3 PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for judgment as follows: 4 5 1. That Plaintiffs take nothing by their Complaint; 6 2. That Plaintiffs' Complaint be dismissed with prejudice; 7 3. That Plaintiffs and the individuals they seek to represent be denied each and every 8 demand and prayer for relief in their action: 9 4. That Plaintiffs are not adequate representatives and/or an aggrieved employees to bring 10 an action under the standards of California Labor Code Section 2698 et seq.; 11 5. That Defendant be awarded attorneys' fees and costs of suit as available pursuant to applicable law; and for other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 12 13 14 DATED: September 8, 2022 Respectfully submitted, 15 SEYFARTH SHAW LLP 16 By: /s/ Timothy M. Rusche 17 Timothy M. Rusche Michael W. Kopp 18 Attorneys for Defendant MARATHON REFINING LOGISTICS 19 SERVICES, LLC 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28